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Jeanine Grenberg’s carefully crafted case in defense of humility 
as a central human virtue starts (Chapter 1) with an account of 
Kantian rational agency in which dependency and corruption mark 
fundamental limits to human moral capacities. She then offers a 
general picture of a Kantian theory of virtue (Chapters 2 and 3) that is 
consonant with this construal of moral agency as dependent and 
corrupt. Grenberg notes that her Kantian based view involves at least 
one important contrast with Aristotelian theories—rather than 
understanding virtues primarily in terms of excellences, a “Kantian 
approach to virtue is . . . in part necessarily ameliorative” (p. 79)—but 
she also argues for important parallels. These include both a 
counterpart to Aristotelian character traits, articulated in a Kantian 
understanding of virtues as principled, and a Kantian thesis on behalf 
of the unity of the virtues. Grenberg then offers (Chapter 4) an 
analysis and response to recent accounts of humility (e.g., by Stephen 
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Hare, Norvin Richards, G. F. Scheuler, David Statman) to which her 
basic objection is that they “have generally rejected any appeal to 
human nature to ground the state [of humility]” and, in so doing, have 
turned to a “behavioristic definition of humility” that relies “upon self-
other comparison as a standard for self-evaluation” (p. 111). Her 
constructive account of “the Kantian virtue of humility” (Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7) treats it as “that meta-attitude which constitutes the moral 
agent’s proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but 
capable and dignified rational agent” (p. 133). A principal concern in 
this account is to provide, through appeal to Kantian notions of 
interest, moral feeling, and respect, a plausible alternative to “the 
comparative-competitive model of humility.” In spelling out this 
alternative, Grenberg advances theses about the ways in which 
humility and a proper self-respect regarding one’s own moral agency 
mutually condition each other and argues, in addition, for taking moral 
exemplars to have a more important function for moral growth and 
education than is typically associated with Kant’s views. Grenberg then 
concludes her case by exploring (Chapters 8 and 9) “humility’s relation 
to the obligatory end of perfection of self” and “how humility is 
relevant to the obligatory end [i.e., beneficence] relative to others” (p. 
217). 
 
There are at least three levels on which Grenberg’s work 
provides bases for significant engagement. First, it can be engaged as 
an exercise in virtue ethics that, by its own enactment of a modestly 
advanced and gently persuasive case, not only brings humility back 
from the margins of discussion, but also suggests that its restoration 
to a more central place in the life of the virtues is of considerable 
importance for truthfully undertaking the moral responsibilities we 
have to ourselves and to one another. Second, it can be engaged as 
an exercise in Kant interpretation that challenges once widely accepted 
views that placed an almost unbridgeable chasm between Kantian 
ethics as deontological and most forms of virtue ethics. Third, it can be 
engaged as an exercise in moral anthropology (or a moral ontology of 
human agency) which opens lines of potentially useful conversation 
with theological ethics and theological anthropology. A remark about 
the first level will serve as introduction to comments about the other 
two; the pivotal point of engagement in all of these is Grenberg’s 
commitment, for which I am in full sympathy, to provide an “account 
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of humility [that] will not abandon questions of human nature” (p. 
111). 
 
Both a sense of self-respect that is not keyed to comparison 
with others and a mutually supportive relationship between self-
respect and respect for others are key elements in Grenberg’s 
construal of humility as a Kantian virtue. She puts both points to 
effective use in her necessarily compact treatment (Chapters 8 and 9) 
of the two main divisions of what Kant terms “the duties of virtue,” 
viz., duties to oneself and duties to others. Her engagement with these 
points through illustrative use of Cordelia from King Lear and Alyosha 
from The Brother Karamazov shows great sensitivity to the complexity 
of the human social relationships in which humility needs to function. 
The latter example—Alyosha’s abortive attempt to make amends to 
Snegirev for the public insult inflicted on him by Alyosha’s brother 
Dmitri—takes cognizance of the fact that matters of social status and 
disparity of power distort both Alyosha’s and Snegirev’s reading of 
what the situation demands morally in terms of both their own self-
respect and their respect for one another. Though both are eventually 
able to correct their prior distorted judgments (discussed in detail on 
pp. 243–50) so as to act toward each other in accord with the 
“humble beneficence” of moral equals, Grenberg’s account does not 
raise the questions of whether or how humility in its Kantian guise 
provides any purchase from which a moral agent might address the 
structural social disparities that cloud proper recognition of one 
another as moral equals. My suspicion is that there may be useful 
resources in Grenberg’s construal of Kantian moral agency and in her 
mutual referencing of self-respect and respect for others to the 
“untrumpable value of moral principles” (p. 161) that open possibilities 
for dealing with such structural issues. It may also be the case that 
both identifying and utilizing those resources will require addressing 
the larger issues that arise in bringing an ethics of virtue to bear upon 
the dynamics of shaping just structures for human society—issues that 
can be posed in Kantian terms as the task of exhibiting more explicitly 
what constitutes the unity of the moral demands articulated in a 
“doctrine of right” with those articulated in a “doctrine of virtue” in an 
account of moral agency. 
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This consideration about the mutual relation of self-respect and 
respect for others within the unity of human moral agency is relevant 
to the two other levels on which Grenberg’s work deserves thoughtful 
engagement. It is no longer surprising to see an interpretation of 
Kant’s ethics in which concepts once taken to be outside the scope of 
his intense focus on right, duty and the autonomous exercise of 
human freedom—e.g., teleology, character, and virtue—are 
reintroduced as important coordinates within his moral theory. Within 
the context of such “revisionist” readings of Kant’s ethics, Grenberg’s 
particular contribution does not lie simply in its eff ort to provide a 
detailed case for taking Kant as both as an important point of 
reference for general discussions of virtue and as insightful expositor 
of the principles that inform a morally rich concept of humility. Of at 
least equal importance in my judgment is her affirmation that an 
account of human agency that is conceptually and morally adequate 
needs to be referenced to an understanding of human nature that is 
not merely empirical and behavioral. Grenberg’s interpretation is thus 
consonant with renewed interest a number of Kant interpreters have 
recently taken in the role that anthropology plays in Kant’s critical 
project. It further suggests that any answer to the question of the 
unity of the “doctrine of right” and the “doctrine of virtue” will, of 
necessity, require an account of the human subject/agent as the locus 
in which the unity of finite, embodied reason is constituted. 
 
This brings us full circle back to Grenberg’s starting point in 
Kant’s account of finite human rational agency as dependent and 
corrupt that is given its most notable exposition in Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason. She articulates that account as “a general 
claim about the human condition: human beings are desiring and 
needy beings who tend in a whole variety of ways to value the self 
improperly relative to other objects of moral value” (p. 48). In a 
manner that is faithful to Kant’s own careful parsing of the differences 
between the moral and the religious and between the philosophical 
and the theological, Grenberg tries to provide “a philosophically 
respectable, and not necessarily religious, account of a transcendent 
standard, and the limits of human nature in the face of it” as the 
context in which to make the case for the centrality of humility for a 
virtuous human life (p. 140). This careful eschewing of paths that lead 
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to the theological—a move that allows affirmation of a “secular (at 
times gentler), but always radical evil”—respects the a-theological 
(and even anti-theological) perspectives informing many of the 
interlocutors her work explicitly engages (p. 42). 
 
I hope, however, that this is does not become the end of 
Grenberg’s “story of dependence, corruption and virtue,” because 
there is reason to think that her work offers something of value for the 
project of constructing philosophical and theological anthropologies 
that can reckon with the fractured aftermath of modernity. Grenberg 
makes a promising start in the direction of providing what Charles 
Taylor calls an “anthropology of situated freedom” (Sources of the 
Self, p. 515) in her depiction of “the challenge of the human condition” 
as “the task of learning to love the self well, that is to love the self in a 
way that does not undermine our equally inherent end of being moral” 
(p. 48). The theological crux here, of course, is the extent to which 
such a properly ordered love of self is only possible in view of first 
being loved by God. 
